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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE 
REQUIREMENT OF A REPUBLICAN 
FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
Jochen Ahr. Frowein * 
l. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND LIBERTY 
The European Community - that is, the factual entity composed of 
three legally separate communities1 which has been and still is one of the 
basic concerns of Eric Stein2 - cannot be understood without taking into 
account European history after 1933. As an irony of history, the stage for a 
new beginning was set by the man who destroyed the old Europe3 and who 
was the reason that so many academics left the "old country" for the new 
world. This new start was not only influenced by the determination of 
those Europeans who had lived through the darkness to overcome the dan-
gers of rivalry but also by those European-Americans who were able to 
build the bridges between the old country of liberty and a Europe trying to 
find new structures.4 The role played by lawyers, historians and social 
scientists familiar with both the old world and the emerging new Europe is 
a story that remains to be written for the benefit of younger generations. 
The European movement cannot be understood without an awareness 
of the firm determination of those Europeans who were not dominated by 
the Soviets to secure the "Blessings of Liberty" in the sense of the preamble 
to the United States Constitution of 1787. The Statute of the Council of 
Europe of May 5, 1949 refers in its preamble to "individual freedom, polit-
ical liberty and the rule oflaw, principles which form the basis of all genu-
ine democracy."5 According to article 3 of the same Statute, "Every 
Member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of 
law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms."6 A State which has seriously violated 
• Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law; Professor of Law, University of Heidelberg; Vice-President of the European Commission 
of Human Rights. M.C.L. 1958, University of Michigan; Dr. Jur. 1960, University of Bonn; 
Dr. h.c. 1984, University of Seville. - Ed. 
I. The three separate communities are the EEC, the European Coal & Steel Community, 
and Euratom. See Stein & Sandalow, On The Two Systems: An Overview, in l COURTS AND 
FREE MARKETS 43 n.l (T. Sandalow & E. Stein eds. 1982). 
2. As the most recent example, see COURTS AND FREE MARKETS, supra note l. 
3. See A. BULLOCK, HlTLER, A STUDY IN TYRANNY 806 (2d ed. 1964): 
Europe may rise again, but the old Europe of the years between 1789, the year of the 
French Revolution, and 1939, the year of Hitler's War, has gone for ever - and the last 
figure in its history is that of Adolf Hitler, the architect of its ruin. 'Si monumentum re-
quiris, circumspice' - 'If you seek his monument, look around.' 
4. Eric Stein acted as "pontifex" of that sort by influencing generations of European stu-
dents at The University of Michigan Law School in Ann Arbor. 
5. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, preamble, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 104 (1951). 
6. Id., at art. 3. 
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these principles may be suspended or even excluded from the Council 
under article 8.7 
The treaties establishing the three different European Communities are 
much less outspoken in that respect than the Statute of the Council of Eu-
rope. The new approach of functional integration made the drafters hesi-
tant to use broad language. Only the last consideration of the preamble to 
the EEC Treaty of March 25, 1957 mentions the determination of the six 
founding members to "preserve and strengthen peace and liberty."8 Article 
230 of the treaty includes appropriate forms of cooperation with the Coun-
cil of Europe in the tasks given to the Community organs, recognizing 
thereby, if only implicitly, that there exists a very important link between 
what is called the Economic Community and the international organization 
that has been given the task of safeguarding freedom and democracy.9 
Who could doubt that the EEC has always considered itself bound by 
these principles? To borrow the words of the first President of the EEC 
Commission, Walter Hallstein, two principles govern the Community -
the rule of law and democracy. 10 But a certain time passed before scholars 
began to discuss more fully the question of the extent to which these princi-
ples must be seen as part of Community law or what their impact on that 
law should be. While the role of fundamental rights in Community law has 
been a major issue in recent years, not much attention has been paid to the 
possible membership consequences of events that occurred in Greece in 
1967 or in Turkey in 1980. The political organs of the European Commu-
nity have always taken for granted that dictatorship is incompatible with 
membership, but the legal consequences of this principle have remained 
somewhat obscure. 11 It will be our task to examine some of the problems 
involved here. 
IL FEDERAL SYSTEMS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF HOMOGENEOUS 
CONSTITUTIONS 
The European Community is far from being a federal system. However, 
federal structures may have a certain value as models with which to com-
pare the development of the Community's institutional system. It would 
seem that much of Eric Stein's writings on the European system is based on 
that understanding. 12 
The basic values offreedom and democracy, or to put it in the language 
7. This procedure was used in the case of Greece in 1970, but Greece left the Council 
before the procedure was completed. See Petzold, .Der gegenwiJrlige Wirkungsbereich der 
Europiiischen Menschenrechlskonvenlion und ihrer Zusalzprolokolle, der Ko11ve11lio11 zur Besei-
tigung al/er Formen von Rassendiskriminierung sowie der Menschenrechlspakle der Verei11le11 
Nationen, 30 ZAoRV 417, 422 (1970). 
8. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Co=unity, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11 (1958). 
9. See SchrOder, in 2 KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, art. 230, at 1116-18 (H. 
Groeben, H. Boeckh, J. Thiesing & C. Ehlermann eds. 3d ed. 1983). 
10. W. liALLSTEIN, DIE EUROPAISCHE GEMEINSCHAFI" 43 (1st ed. 1973). 
11. It was always a co=on understanding before 1974 that Spain and Portugal could not 
be admitted without a change of their constitutional structures. 
12. See, e.g., Stein, Towards a European Foreign Policy? - European Foreign Affairs Sys-
tem from the Perspective of the United Sia/es Conslilution, in METHODS, TOOLS AND POTilN• 
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of article IV of the United States Constitution, of the "Republican Form of 
Government" are of a nature that is not compatible with a fundamentally 
different constitutional system. It is a widespread feature of federal systems 
based on the principle of democracy that the member states are under a 
formal constitutional obligation to keep within a certain homogeneity con-
cerning their own constitutional system. This rule was first implemented in 
1787 in article IV of the United States Constitution.13 The Germ.an consti-
tution of 1849, which never came into force, provided for a responsible gov-
ernment with a representative chamber elected by the people in all the 
German states. 14 The Swiss constitution of 1874,15 the Weimar Constitu-
tion of 191916 and the Bonn constitution of 194917 are all based on the same 
principle. Australia, 18 Canada 19 and India20 also apply this rule. The Ger-
man federal system created by Bismarck in 1871 consisted mostly of monar-
chies but also included the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lubeck.21 
The federal constitution said nothing about minimum requirements for the 
states, not even concerning representation of the people, something which 
did not exist in the two Mecklenburgs until 1918.22 This exception in a 
monarchical federal structure proves the rule. It is a structural impossibility 
for a federal system of a democratic nature to have members with basically 
different constitutional systems. 
There are important differences in the enforcement of the principle just 
outlined. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the issue of 
whether a particular state's condition is compatible with article IV is a 
political question over which the Court has no jurisdiction.23 It is for the 
political organs, Congress and the President, to make sure that there is no 
violation of the principle of homogeneity. Congress, by enacting legislation 
pursuant to article I, section 8, clause 15, in 1792, had already given the 
President a clear enforcement power for cases in which "the laws of the 
United States shall be opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in any 
state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course 
TIAL FOR EUROPEAN LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE LIGHT OF AMERICAN FEDERAL 
EXPERIENCE (M. Cappelletti & J. Weiler eds. forthcoming). 
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. (''The United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government."). 
14. For text of the Constitution of 1849, see F. SIEBERT, VON FRANKFURT NACH BONN DIE 
DEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNGEN 1849-1949 at 18 (1964). For the history of the German revolu-
tion 1848-1849, see 2 E. HUBER, DEUTSCHE VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE SEIT 1789 at 502-14, 
767-73 (1960). See also J. MATTERN, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL REPUBLIC 35-44 (1928). 
15. B. VERF., CONST., COST. FED. art. 6 {Switz.). 
16. DIE VERFASSUNG DES DEUTSCHEN REICHS VON 1919 art. 17 (Ger.). 
17. GG art. 28 (W. Ger.). 
18. AUSTRALIA CONST. ch. V, §§ 106-20. 
19. CANADA CONST. arts. 58-90. 
20. INDIA CONST. arts. 152-237. 
21. For the structure of the federal system of 1871, see 3 E. HUBER, supra note 14, at 785 
(1963). 
22. 4 E. HUBER, supra note 14, at 422 (1969). 
23. E.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42, 46-47 (1849). 
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of judicial proceeding[s]."24 Under those conditions, the President may call 
forth the militia or use the regular army - as was done, for instance, in 
Arkansas in 1957 when the governor refused to comply with federal court 
orders.25 One may wonder, however, whether the political question doc-
trine would be involved today if, for example, a state legislature purported 
to delegate all legislative power to the governor. Indeed, by applying the 
one-man/one-vote principle to the states in Baker v. Carr,26 the Supreme 
Court in fact exercised jurisdiction over one of the most important aspects 
of what constitutes a "Republican Form of Government." 
The federal systems on the European continent have an old tradition 
called "Bundesaufsicht" (federal control or supervision) as well as 
"Bundeszwang" or "Bundesexekution" (federal execution). The control in-
volves on the one hand the execution of federal laws by state authorities, an 
approach that is quite common in Switzerland and Germany.27 But it also 
includes at least partly the procedures through which to insure that the pro-
visions of state constitutions are compatible with the homogeneity provi-
sions of the federal constitution. The possibility of execution clearly exists 
where a state government no longer respects the basic principles of democ-
racy made obligatory by the federal constitution.28 During the difficult 
years of Weimar there were several cases where the "Reichswehr," the fed-
eral army, had to be used against Land-governments that had implemented 
24. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, § 2, I Stat. 264, repealed by Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, 
§ IO, I Stat. 425. 
25. See N. Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1957, at I, col. 6. 
26. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
27. See GG art. 84 (W. Ger.); PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MANY, THE BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 52 (1977): 
{I) Where the Laender execute federal laws as matters of their own concern, they shall 
provide for the establishment of the requisite authorities and the regulation of administra-
tive procedures in so far as federal laws consented to by the Bundesrat do not otherwise 
provide. 
(2) The Federal Government may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, issue pertinent gen-
eral administrative rules. 
(3) The Federal Government shall exercise supervision to ensure that the Laender exe-
cute the federal laws in accordance with applicable law. For this purpose the Federal 
Government may send commissioners to the highest Land authorities and with their con-
sent or, if such consent is refused, with the consent of the Bundesrat, also to subordinate 
authorities. 
(4) Should any shortcomings which the Federal Government has found to exist in the 
execution of federal laws in the Laender not be corrected, the Bundesrat shall decide, on 
the application of the Federal Government or the Land concerned, whether such Land 
has violated applicable law. The decision of the Bundesrat may be challenged in the 
Federal Constitutional Court. 
(5) With a view to the execution of federal laws, the Federal government may be author-
ized by a federal law requiring the consent of the Bundesrat to issue individual instruc-
tions for particular cases. They shall be addressed to the highest Land authorities unless 
the Federal Government considers the matter urgent. 
28. See GG art. 37 (W. Ger.); PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL, supra note 27, at 29: 
(I) If a Land fails to comply with its obligations of a federal character imposed by this 
Basic Law or another federal law, the Federal Government may, with the consent of the 
Bundesrat, take the necessary measures to enforce such compliance by the Land by way of 
federal enforcement. 
(2) To carry out such federal enforcement the Federal Government or its commissioner 
shall have the right to give instructions to all Laender and their authorities. 
See also J. FROWEIN, DIE SELBSTANDIGE BUNDESAUFSICHT NACH DEM GRUNDGESETZ (1961). 
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non-republican constitutional systems.29 An early example was the so-
called "Rate-System" established in Bavaria for a short time.30 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, it is clear that the Federal Consti-
tutional Court has full jurisdiction to decide whether or not a state constitu-
tion is in line with article 28 of the Basic Law, which lays down the 
principles of democracy binding for the states. 31 Indeed, cases of that sort 
have been before the Court, although they have not been very spectacular. 
Probably the most interesting one concerned the problem of whether the 
parliamentary system of government guaranteed for the federal level 
should be seen as included in article 28.32 A long line of decisions clarified 
the requirements of the electoral provisions made binding for the Lander in 
article 28.33 
The Swiss Constitution of 1874 introduced an interesting system of fed-
eral guaranty for the cantonal constitutions. By a specific procedure, the 
Federal Assembly must verify that a cantonal constitution does not contain 
any provision contrary to the Federal Constitution and that it secures the 
exercise of political rights according to republican principles, be they repre-
sentative or directly democratic (as in a few of the so-called "Urkantone" or 
earliest cantons).34 If a canton fails to comply with these rules, an execu-
tion is possible under Swiss constitutional law.35 The Federal Tribunal has 
jurisdiction in cases where it is argued that constitutional rights of citizens 
are not respected by cantonal laws.36 
Ill. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
When the European Council met in Copenhagen in 1978, it declared 
that respect for and maintenance of parliamentary democracy and human 
rights in all member states are essential elements of membership in the 
29. 6 E. HUBER, supra note 14, at 741 (1981). 
30. This happened before the constitution had been adopted. See 5 E. HUBER, supra note 
14, at 1113 (1978). 
31. GG art. 28 (W. Ger.); PARLIAMENTARY COUNCIL, supra note 27, at 25: 
(1) The constitutional order in the Laender must conform to the principles of republican, 
democratic and social government based on the rule of law, within the meaning of this 
Basic Law. In each of the Laender, counties (Kreise), and co=unes (Gemeinden), the 
people must be represented by a body chosen in general, direct, free, equal, and secret 
elections. In the comunes the assembly of the co=une may take the place of an elected 
body. 
(2) The co=unes must be guaranteed the right to regulate on their own responsibility 
all the affairs of the local co=unity within the limits set by law. The associations of 
communes (Gemeindeverbaende) shall also have the right of self-government in accord-
ance with the law and within the limits of the functions assigned to them by law. 
(3) The Federation shall ensure that the constitutional order of the Laender conforms to 
the basic rights and to the provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article. 
32. Judgment of July 22, 1969, Bundesverfassungsgericht, W. Ger., 27 BVerfG 44, 55 
(1969). 
33. Frowein, .Die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Wah/recht, 99 ARCHIV 
DES OFF. R. 72 (1974). 
34. See F. FLEINER & z. GIACOMETTI, ScHWEIZERISCHES BUNDESSTAATSRECHT 131 
(1949). 
35. Id. at 127. 
36. The Federal Tribunal will not, however, control whether a provision of the cantonal 
constitutions verified by the Federal Assembly is in line with the Federal Constitution. 
1316 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 82:1311 
Community.37 In 1979, the European Parliament proposed that a formal 
obligation should be entered into by old members and those wanting to join 
the Community. According to this agreement, all the states should respect 
the principles of civil rights and pluralist democracy. The resolution adds 
an interesting consideration which suggests that the European Court of Jus-
tice should have power to decide whether or not a state fails to respect these 
principles, because such a failure would be incompatible with Community 
membership.38 
The Institutional Committee of the European Parliament adopted the 
same approach in its report of July 15, 1983, which reads in No. 26: 
26. In the case of serious and persistent infringement of democratic princi-
ples or fundamental rights - established by the Court of Justice at the 
request of the Parliament or of the Commission - the European Council, 
on receiving the endorsement of the legislative and executive bodies, shall 
take measures: 
suspending the application of part or the whole of the treaty mecha-
nisms to the State in question and its nationals, 
which may go as far as suspending participation in the Institutions of 
the Union by the State in question and its nationals who are members 
of the Institutions of the Union.39 
In the Resolution concerning the substance of the preliminary draft 
Treaty establishing the European Union of September 14, 1983, the Euro-
pean Parliament adopted the following provisions: 
8. The Union and its Member States consider the underlying principles 
of European society to be pluralist democracy, the rule of law, freedom, 
the exercise and protection of fundamental civil, economic, social and 
political rights, the preservation of the natural bases of life and cultural 
values, the fulfilment of resulting obligations and the principle of resolving 
international disputes through the intermediary of international organiza-
tions and negotiations; respect for these principles is necessary for the 
existence of the Union and for membership thereof. 
9. Civil and political rights: The Union and the Member States undertake 
to protect the dignity of the individual and to respect and grant to any 
person coming within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms that shall 
be contained in the Treaty and those stemming from the common princi-
ples embodied in the Constitutions of the Member States and the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. 
26. In the case of serious and persistent infringement of democratic prin-
ciples or fundamental rights - established by the Court of Justice at the 
request of the Parliament or of the Commission - the European Council, 
on receiving the endorsement of the legislative and executive bodies, shall 
take measures: 
suspending the application of part or the whole of the Treaty mecha-
nisms to the State in question and its nationals, 
37. Declaration on democracy, BULL. EuR. COMM., No. 3, at 6 (1978). 
38. See Parliament Resolution on the prospects of enlargement of the Community, Part 
One: political and institutional aspects, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 39) 47 (Feb. 12, 1979). 
39. 1983-84 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-575/83/A) 12 (1983). 
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- which may go as far as suspending participation in the institutions of 
the Union by the State in question and its nationals who are members 
of the institutions of the Union.40 
The final version of the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union was 
adopted by the European Parliament on February 14, 1984, and reads in 
part: 
Art. 4 - Fundamental rights: 
(1) The Union shall protect the dignity of the individual and grant every 
person coming within its jurisdiction the fundamental rights and freedoms 
derived in particular from the common principles of the Constitutions of 
the Member States and from the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
(2) The Union undertakes to maintain and develop, within the limits of its 
competences, the economic, social and cultural rights derived from the 
Constitutions of the Member States and from the European Social Charter. 
(3) Within a period of five years, the Union shall take a decision on its 
accession to the international instruments referred to above and to the 
United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. Within the same period, the Union shall adopt 
its own declaration on fundamental rights in accordance with the proce-
dure for revision laid down in Article 84 of this Treaty. 
(4) In the event of serious and persistent violation of democratic principles 
or fundamental rights by a Member State, penalties may be imposed in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 44 of this Treaty. 
Art. 44 - Sanctions 
In the case provided for in Article 4 of this Treaty, and in every other case 
of serious and persistent violation by a Member State of the provisions of 
the Treaty, established by the Court of Justice at the request of the Parlia-
ment or the Commission, the European Council may, after hearing the 
Member State concerned and with the approval of the Parliament, take 
measures: 
suspending the rights deriving from the applications of part or the 
whole of the Treaty provisions to the State in question and its 
nationals, 
which may go as far as suspending participation by the State in ques-
tion in the European Council, the Council of the Union and any other 
organ in which that State is represented as such. The State in question 
shall not participate in the vote on the sanctions.41 
The principles stated here have to a certain extent already played a role 
in Community practice. After the military coup in Spain failed in 1981, the 
Parliament - clearly referring to Spain's possible membership - con-
firmed the view that a pluralistic parliamentary system and respect for 
human rights are conditions for accession and membership.42 After the 
military took over in Greece in 196743 and in Turkey in 1980,44 the associa-
40. Parliament Resolution concerning the substance of the preliminary draft Treaty estab-
lishing the European Union, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 277) 95, 97, 100 (Oct. 17, 1983). 
41. 1983-84 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 1-1200/83/A) 9, 24 (1983). 
42. Parliament Resolution on the attempted coup d'etat in Spain, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. 
(No, C 77) 85 (Apr. 6, 1981). 
43. Le Parlement Resolution sur !'association entre la C.E.E. et la Grece, 10 J.O. COMM. 
EUR. 2058 (June 2, 1967). 
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tion treaties were to a great extent "frozen." 
Where a member state of the European Community violates the general 
principle of homogeneity the question as to possible consequences will nec-
essarily arise. While the Statute of the Council of Europe contains specific 
rules for the exclusion of members that have violated the principles of de-
mocracy and fundamental rights, the Community treaties are silent on the 
matter.45 Since all member states of the Community are now also bound 
by the European Convention on Human Rights, an interstate application 
under article 24 of the Convention is always possible. The case of Ireland v. 
United Kingdo~6 is an example of an interstate procedure between two 
member states of the European Community. However, it would seem most 
astonishing if such a procedure were the only reaction in a case in which a 
member state had completely changed its constitutional system, for instance 
by a military coup. One wonders whether Community law has nothing 
more to offer. 
IV. ARTICLE 169 AS A BASIS FOR COMMUNITY REACTION 
An important question is whether or not article 169 can be used against 
a member state whose constitutional system is no longer in line with the 
principles recognized by the Community's fundamental structure. This in-
quiry presupposes that a member state under those circumstances has vio-
lated the obligations of the EEC Treaty or secondary EEC law.47 Article 
169 only applies where treaty obligations are violated. Can one go so far as 
to include an obligation concerning the constitutional principles of a free 
democracy in the unwritten part of the EEC constitution? Some doubts 
remain. 
There is, however, one provision of EEC law that becomes important 
here. According to article 1 of the EEC Act on direct elections, free elec-
tions to the European Parliament form part of the acquis communautaire.48 
There is clearly a Community obligation for the member states to organize 
real (meaning free) elections to the European Parliament. This is not 
merely an unimportant formal obligation that may be easily neglected. The 
European Parliament represents the peoples in the Community. Even in the 
absence of legislative competence, it has become an essential organ in the 
Community's constitutional structure. Where a state does not permit free 
elections to the European Parliament, a procedure under article 169 would 
seem quite possible. Of course, this procedure could not really aim at con-
stitutional change in the member state, but would instead address one of its 
consequences. It is probably not very likely that such a procedure would be 
44. Parliament Resolution on the military junta in Turkey, 24 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. C 
101) 110 (May 4, 1981). 
45. See text at notes 7-11 supra. 
46. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1978 Y. B. EUR. CONV. HUM. RTS. 602 (Eur. Ct. of 
Human Rights). 
47. As to the practice under article 169 see C. Ehlermann, Die Verfolgung von Ver/rags• 
ver/elzungen der Mitgliedstaaten, in EUROPAISCHE GERICHTSBARKEIT UNO NATIONALE 
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT 135 (W. Grewe, H. Rupp & H. Schneider eds. 1981). 
48. Council Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct 
universal suffrage, 19 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 278) I, 5 (Oct. 8, 1976). 
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in the forefront of considerations if a military coup or other event had re-
ally changed the constitutional structure in one of the member states. 
V. REACTIONS UNDER ARTICLES 224 AND 225 
The emergency clauses of articles 224 and 225 should be considered as a 
possible community mechanism in case a member state violates the basic 
constitutional principles underlying the Community structure.49 According 
to article 224, the Treaty presupposes that a member state may be called 
upon to take measures in the event of serious internal disturbances. These 
measures may affect the functioning of the common market. This provision 
recognizes that emergency measures are still completely in the national 
sphere of jurisdiction. However, the article accepts that in such an eventu-
ality the common market could be affected by the emergency measures and 
therefore calls on the member states to cooperate in order to avoid such an 
effect. 
How can the common market be affected by those emergency measures? 
It is clear that the five freedoms, especially the free movement of goods and 
workers, could be restricted on the basis of the emergency measures antici-
pated in article 224. However, the functioning of the EEC institutions that 
guarantee and protect the common market cannot be separated from the 
.five freedoms. Therefore, an emergency measure which would curtail dem-
ocratic freedoms to such an extent that the constitutional system would be 
altered must also be seen as affecting the common market. Under those 
conditions, free elections to the European Parliament would no longer be 
possible. As a result, the state's representative in the Council would have 
no democratic mandate. 
Article 225, paragraph 2 takes into account the possibility that a mem-
ber state may make improper use of the powers provided for in article 224. 
Again, this rule applies primarily to the specific restrictions concerning the 
freedoms of the common market. But the most serious form of improper 
use would of course be the change of the constitutional system into one that 
would be incompatible with the EEC system. It is a common experience 
that all founders of dictatorships in recent history have tried to justify their 
action by referring to a national emergency that allegedly threatened seri-
ous internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order. Even 
where this sort of argument is only a pretext, the applicability of articles 224 
and 225 cannot be excluded. The mere fact that a member state govern-
ment would seriously restrict democratic freedoms should be seen as an act 
being taken in "the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the 
maintenance of law and order." Although one may admit that this sort of 
applicability was not foreseen when the articles were drafted, it would not 
seem to be correct to limit their bearing to the more technical side of the 
common market. 
Article 224 does not clearly state what kind of action can be taken by 
the other member states. They are obligated to consult each other with a 
view to taking together the steps needed to avoid affecting the functioning 
49. Frowein, Die recht/iche Bedeutung des Verfassungsprinzips der parlamentarischen 
Demokratieflir den europliischen lntegrationsprozess, 1983 EuR 301, 312. 
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of the common market. If at all possible, the member state concerned 
should take part in the consultation. However, this will frequently be im-
possible. Necessary steps in the sense provided for in article 224 may well 
entail the suspension of the treaty rights of the member state that changed 
its constitutional structure. This suspension may be the only way to avoid 
seriously affecting the whole structure of the community system.50 
Article 225, paragraph 2 makes it possible to bring the matter directly 
before the Court of Justice. Either the Commission or any other member 
state would have to argue that the state that changed its constitutional struc-
ture had made improper use of the powers provided for in article 224, 
namely the powers to tackle an emergency. The Court of Justice could act 
immediately and could also take any necessary interim measures under ar-
ticle 186 of the treaty. 
Even if article 224 was not originally drafted to include matters of con-
stitutional homogeneity between the Community's member states it seems 
preferable to stay within the community system when dealing with such an 
event.51 That legal provisions acquire a wider applicability through the de-
velopment of the legal structure within which the provision finds itself is a 
possibility not at all unknown in the national legal systems. 
VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF EXCLUDING A MEMBER STATE 
While articles 224 and 225 have not yet been considered in the context 
discussed here, some authors have submitted that in a similar case the coun-
try could be excluded from the Community. Zuleeg especially sees the ex-
clusion as a last resort where a member state changes its constitutional 
structure to an undemocratic system.52 He is of the opinion that one could 
not require the democratic member states to take part in a law-making pro-
cedure in which the representative of a dictatorship participates. This ex-
clusion is, of course, nowhere provided for. It would have to be accepted as 
an unwritten emergency measure. However, since articles 224 and 225 off er 
solutions going up to the full suspension of all membership rights, it seems 
very doubtful whether there is any necessity to accept exclusion as possible. 
The principle of proportionality should be respected also in case of emer-
gency. It is difficult to see that anything more would be required than sus-
50. See Matthies, in 2 KOl',fMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, supra note 9, art. 224, at 1034-
36; J. Frowein, Sllpra note 49, at 313. 
5 I. The applicability of general rules of international Jaw in such an event would certainly 
not fit better into the structure of community law. See H. IPSEN, EUROPAISCHES GEMEIN-
SCHAFTSRECHT 100-01 (1972); Everling, Sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europiiischen Ge111ei11-
schqji noch Herren der Verlriige?, in VoLKERRECHT ALS RECHTSORDUNG INTERNATIONALE 
GERICHTSBARKEIT MENSCHENRECHTE-FESTSCHRIFT FUR HERMANN MOSLER J 73, 183 (Bei-
trlige zum ausllindischen ciffentlichen Recht und Vcilkerrecht Vol. 81, 1983); Schwarze, JJas 
allgemeine Volkerrechl in den innergemeinschqfilichen Rechtsbezieh11nge11, 1983 EuR I; see also 
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Roemer in Muller v. European Economic Community (Nos. 
109/63 & 13/64), 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 663 (delivered Nov. 18, 1964). 
52. Zuleeg, Der Bestand der Europiiischen Gemeinschafl, in I DAS EUROPA DER ZWEITEN 
GENERATION, GEDACHTNISSCHRIFT FUR C. SASSE, 55, 65 (R. Bieber & D. Nickel eds. 1981); 
see also H. WEBER, SCHUTZKLAUSELN UND WJRTSCHAFTSINTEGRATION 450 (1982); M. Hilf, 
in KOMMENTAR ZUM EWG-VERTRAG, Sllpra note 9, art. 240, ~ 13, at 1331. 
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pension of membership rights during the existence of the nondemocratic 
government in the member state. 
Indeed, it may well be that return to democracy and the rule of law 
could be generally encouraged by a system which will only suspend mem-
bership rights for the duration of such an event. 
VIL CREATING HOMOGENEOUS STANDARDS THROUGH THE 
COMMUNITY 
It is a well-known phenomenon that federal structures not only presup-
pose a certain uniformity or at least comparability of component subentities 
but also create a homogeneous structure. Fundamental rights and their pro-
tection through federal organs provide a very important mechanism to cre-
ate uniformity. As soon as there exists a federal court enforcing a bill of 
rights vis-a-vis the different states, uniform standards concerning the pro-
tection of fundamental rights will develop. This development can be shown 
by the growing harmonization brought about by the jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court concerning the Bill of Rights. It can also be 
shown by the history of federal structures in Europe. For example, one 
specific aim of the drafters of the bill of rights in Germany in 1848 was to 
create common standards for the protection of fundamental rights in the 
different member states.53 This constitution failed and in 1871 no bill of 
rights was included in the German federal constitution. One of the reasons 
was the fear of the harmonizing influence that a bill of rights would have.54 
In Switzerland, the slow movement toward federal protection of fundamen-
tal rights through the Federal Tribunal is of particular interest. After the 
adoption of the Swiss federal constitution in 1874, forty years elapsed 
before the Federal Tribunal finally became competent to review cantonal 
acts on the basis of all the fundamental rights guaranteed in the federal 
constitution. The reason for this slow development was again the fear that 
the Federal Tribunal's interpretation could have a strong harmonizing 
influence.55 
There is as yet no bill of rights of the European Communities. One of 
the common British arguments against the European Communities joining 
the European Convention on Human Rights is the fear that such a move 
would exert an indirect influence upon British law's guarantee of funda-
mental rights. Although technically not quite correct, the idea seems to be 
that English courts would not be willing to control community acts on the 
basis of the provisions of the European Convention or possibly to refer the 
case to the European Court of Justice under article 177 of the EEC Treaty 
unless they were also willing to apply the same standards to English law. 
But even without a Community bill of rights, one clearly finds examples 
for the harmonizing influence of Community structures. The law-making 
and decision-making process in the Communities always exposes different 
national standards to each other. Some common denominator has to be 
53. See text at notes 14-22 supra. 
54. See E. HUBER, supra note 14, at 665, 758. 
55. MUller, Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeil im Gefuge der Staatsfunktionen, 39 VVDSTRL 
53, 58-60 (1981). 
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found. Legal structures with a certain experience in constitutional protec-
tion of fundamental rights may offer some guidance in the area. It would 
seem, for example, that standards such as proportionality and protection of 
legitimate reliance were to some extent influenced by German constitu-
tional and administrative court practice. 
Especially at a time when movements toward a stronger community sys-
tem seem rather unlikely, we should not underestimate the more subtle in-
fluence of existing common European structures. The procedural character 
of the Community system has important effects here.56 Besides the Euro-
pean Communities, it is the system of the European Convention on Human 
Rights which during recent years has become an instrument to shape com-
mon standards for the protection of fundamental rights.57 The European 
Court of Justice has adopted the Convention principles into Community 
law. It is an open question whether a stronger link between Community 
and Convention can still be found.58 
It is hoped that a real test concerning the principle of harmony between 
the democratic structures of the member states and the fundamental princi-
ples of the Community can be avoided and tr.at the slow harmonizing influ-
ence of Community structures will lead to an increasing recognition of 
common fundamental standards within Europe. 
56. See Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, I Y.B. 
EUR. L. 267 (1981). 
57. See J. FROWEIN, DER EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ UNO DIE NATIONALE GE-
RICHTSBARKEIT (1983). 
58. As to this problem see House of Lords, SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COM• 
MUNITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS 1979-80 Sess., Rep. No. 71, and GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ IN EUROPA 
(H. Mosler, R. Bernhardt & M. Hilf eds. 1977). 
